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Harry Potter and the (Re)Order of the 
Artists: Are We Muggles or Goblins? 
n our modern, globalized world, conceptions of the ownership of 
property, especially artistic and cultural property, are continually 
being challenged and revised.  In Harry Potter and the Deathly 
Hallows,1 author J.K. Rowling uses a nonhuman species, the goblins, 
to bring this reconception into sharp relief.  According to Rowling, 
goblins have an intriguing view of ownership rights in artistic works.2  
They believe that the creator of an artistic object maintains an 
ongoing ownership interest in that object even after it is sold, and the 
creator is therefore entitled to get the object back when the purchaser 
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1 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS (2007) [hereinafter 
DEATHLY HALLOWS]. 
2 Id. at 516–17. 
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dies.  While this view may strike some as rather odd when it is 
applied to tangible property in our “Muggle” (that is, nonmagical 
human) world,3 it actually has some very interesting parallels to the 
legal treatment of intangible property, particularly in the areas of 
intellectual property and moral rights.  The first Part of this Article 
lays out the goblin view of property, and the second Part examines 
some of the parallels between that view and Muggle law. 
The third Part of this Article explores the question of whether we 
Muggles are becoming goblins.  The ways in which the parallels 
between our law and the goblin view have been developing and 
growing suggest that we are becoming more goblinish in our 
willingness to recognize ongoing rights in artistic objects, including 
allowing an artist to collect a commission on subsequent resale of his 
or her work.  Practical and social considerations suggest that we are 
unlikely to go as far as granting creators a permanent personal right 
that lets them reclaim such an object after a sale or other transfer is 
made.  However, we are moving closer to recognizing some forms of 
the collective property right that the goblins actually seem to demand, 
namely a moral right in important cultural objects that enables the 
descendants of that culture as a group to demand the return of the 
object.  Thus, we Muggles may not be as far from the goblins as we 
may have first believed. 
I 
THE GOBLIN VIEW OF OWNERSHIP 
In Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, Harry and his friends 
have enlisted the assistance of the goblin Griphook in planning and 
executing a dangerous scheme.4  In exchange for Griphook’s help, 
 
3 The term “Muggle,” in Harry’s Wizarding world, refers to a nonmagical human.  This 
Article borrows the term here to refer to aspects of the real, mundane world we (at least 
most of us) inhabit.  The term “Muggle” also brings out an interesting point related to the 
capitalization of group names.  For simplicity, this Article follows Rowling’s convention 
of always capitalizing “Muggle,” never capitalizing “goblin,” and capitalizing “wizard” 
only when referring to Wizards as a cultural group.  Arguably, the last rule should be 
followed in all cases—lower case should be used when referring to an individual, and 
upper case should be used when referring to a group or cultural identity.  Indeed, 
Rowling’s failure to capitalize her references to goblin culture might be interpreted as 
reflecting a very Wizard-centric (wizard-centric?) view of the world, one that relegates 
goblin culture to a lower status. 
4 Although this Article assumes that the reader has either read the book or does not 
intend to do so, it will provide as little in the way of “spoilers” as is consistent with 
making its point. 
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Harry has promised to give Griphook a sword of goblin manufacture, 
the sword of Godric Gryffindor, which is currently in Harry’s 
possession.  Harry’s friend Bill Weasley, who is not in on the scheme 
but who has worked closely with goblins for many years, pulls Harry 
aside to warn him about the risks of making bargains with goblins, 
“most particularly if that bargain involves treasure.”5  Bill notes that 
“[g]oblin notions of ownership, payment, and repayment are not the 
same as human ones,”6 then goes on to explain the source of his 
concern: 
 “[T]here is a belief among some goblins . . . that wizards cannot 
be trusted in matters of gold and treasure, that they have no respect 
for goblin ownership.” 
 “I respect—” Harry began, but Bill shook his head. 
 “You don’t understand, Harry, nobody could understand unless 
they have lived with goblins.  To a goblin, the rightful and true 
master of any object is the maker, not the purchaser.  All goblin-
made objects are, in goblin eyes, rightfully theirs.” 
 “But if it was bought—” 
 “—then they would consider it rented by the one who had paid 
the money.  They have, however, great difficulty with the idea of 
goblin-made objects passing from wizard to wizard.  You saw 
Griphook’s face when the tiara passed under his eyes.  He 
disapproves.  I believe he thinks, as do the fiercest of his kind, that 
it ought to have been returned to the goblins once the original 
purchaser died.  They consider our habit of keeping goblin-made 
objects, passing them from wizard to wizard without further 
payment, little more than theft.”7 
Thus, according to Bill, goblins believe that the individual creator 
of a tangible artistic object maintains an ongoing property interest in 
that object. 
An earlier exchange involving a beautiful tiara owned by Bill’s 
Aunt Muriel presages this discussion of goblin views: 
Fleur [Bill’s wife] drew out a worn velvet case, which she opened 
to show the wandmaker.  The tiara sat glittering and twinkling in 
the light from the low-hanging lamp. 
“Moonstones and diamonds,” said Griphook, who had sidled into 
the room without Harry noticing.  “Made by goblins, I think?” 
 
5 DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 516. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 517. 
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“And paid for by wizards,” said Bill quietly, and the goblin shot 
him a look that was both furtive and challenging.8 
Griphook thus appears to covet the return of this goblin-made tiara 
in addition to the sword, and Bill responds by asserting his wizard 
family’s claim to it. 
However, Griphook’s actual words and actions do not entirely 
support this view of goblin beliefs, suggesting instead what would 
seem to be a somewhat different conception.  Griphook’s words and 
actions pertain only to the rights of goblins, as a race or cultural 
group, to artistic works created by earlier goblin artisans.  The two 
main artistic objects at issue, the sword and the tiara, are both at least 
several centuries old.9  Griphook makes no reference to knowing the 
particular creator of either piece, or being descended from any such 
creator, as would be expected if his claim were based on the view 
described by Bill.  Rather, he makes his claim on behalf of the goblins 
as a group.  For example, he says he wants the sword back because, 
“[i]t is a lost treasure, a masterpiece of goblinwork!  It belongs with 
the goblins!”10  Thus, he does not espouse precisely the view that the 
artist maintains a continuing relationship with the artistic object that 
Bill ascribes to the goblins, but rather a right to have important 
cultural artifacts returned to the descendants of their creators as a 
cultural group.  Furthermore, Bill’s assertion of what goblins believe 
implies a more economic motive, in that what they seem to desire is a 
new payment to the goblins for each subsequent transfer.  In contrast, 
Griphook seems to desire return of the object itself because of its 
importance as a cultural artifact. 
Because the book discusses only ancient artifacts explicitly, it 
provides no direct evidence of Griphook’s views regarding more 
recent objects of goblin craftsmanship.  Given this gap in knowledge, 
the two pronouncements are not necessarily inconsistent; in fact they 
may be reconcilable.  For example, goblins might view a particular 
object as belonging to the individual creator for his or her11 lifetime, 
 
8 Id. at 512. 
9 See id. at 505–06 (discussing the acquisition of the sword by Godric Gryffindor, who 
had lived “over a thousand years ago,” J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE 
CHAMBER OF SECRETS 150 (1999) [hereinafter CHAMBER OF SECRETS]); DEATHLY 
HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 141 (according to Bill’s Aunt Muriel, the tiara has “been in my 
family for centuries”). 
10 Id. at 506. 
11 Although to the best of the author’s recollection no female goblins are mentioned in 
any of the Harry Potter books, this Article will assume that they exist. 
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and perhaps longer, for the economic benefit of the creator.  At that 
point, the object may fall into the possession of the goblins as a group 
because of the object’s continuing importance as a cultural artifact.  In 
any case, the two views have somewhat different parallels in Muggle 
law, and this Article will discuss them separately when the distinction 
is relevant.12 
II 
PARALLELS TO OWNERSHIP UNDER MUGGLE LAW 
A.  Tangible Property Law 
The view of property ownership that asserts an ongoing ownership 
right in a sold object seems least like Muggle law when considered in 
terms of the rules of ownership interests in tangible property.  In 
general, we Muggles expect to be able to do as we wish with objects 
we purchase, including reselling them or otherwise passing them on 
as we see fit.13  Under Muggle law, the creator of an artistic object 
 
12 An additional complication arises from the nature of the sword as a magical object, 
not merely an artistic one.  In the Wizarding world, magical objects have, to varying 
degrees, a limited control over who can own and use them.  For example, magic wands 
behave differently depending on who they view as their true owner and how their current 
holder obtained them.  See, e.g., DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 494 (“‘The wand 
chooses the wizard,’ said Ollivander.  ‘That much has always been clear to those of us 
who have studied wandlore. . . . Subtle laws govern wand ownership, but the conquered 
wand will usually bend its will to its new master.’”).  In an earlier book, the sword of 
Gryffindor magically presented itself to Harry in his time of need.  See CHAMBER OF 
SECRETS, supra note 9, at 319–20, 333–34.  Indeed, Harry’s friend, Hermione Granger, 
uses this earlier event as an argument supporting Harry’s ownership interest in the sword, 
but she is informed that “[a]ccording to reliable historical sources, the sword may present 
itself to any worthy Gryffindor [House member].”  DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 
129.  It has thus been suggested that the rule of ownership in the wizarding world might be 
“in a magical system the ability to manifest an object is prima facie evidence of rightful 
ownership.”  Reply Posting of Eric j to Asymmetrical Information: An Opinion-Ridden 
Free-for-All Blog, http://www.janegalt.net/archives/009921.php#131305 (July 26, 2007 
9:22 AM).  But see Reply Posting of Mike S. to Asymmetrical Information: An Opinion-
Ridden Free-for-All Blog, http://www.janegalt.net/archives/009921.php#131322 (July 26, 
2007 12:08 PM) (“In a system with controlled teleportation and sapient/semi-sapient 
magical artifacts of varying motivation . . .[,] I don’t think a standard like that would be 
very practical.”).  Resolving the ownership interests of such self-determining objects raises 
some complex questions: Does the original owner lose his or her rights if the object 
chooses a new master?  Or does the original owner retain those rights, and the wizard who 
receives the object’s allegiance have only a limited right of use, somewhat analogous to an 
easement?  Muggle law does not consider this issue because Muggle objects are not self-
determining; this Article will therefore not explore this idea further. 
13 Such free alienability of objects via sale is a strong value of our legal system—hence 
the classic statement that restraints on alienation are “disfavored.”  See, e.g., Bank of Am., 
N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“‘[R]estraint[s] on 
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could fashion an ongoing, goblin-like relationship to that object by 
granting the purchaser a life estate in the object, with the creator 
retaining the reversion.14  In this situation, the creator would retain an 
ownership interest in the object while, at the time of the grant, 
surrendering possession to the purchaser as the holder of the life 
estate.  The creator would then be entitled to recover possession of the 
object upon the death of the life tenant.  However, such a relationship 
in an artistic object would only be created by explicit agreement of 
the parties.  In contrast, Bill’s statement suggests that goblins would 
automatically apply such a rule to all transactions involving goblin-
made objects.15 
B.  Intellectual Property Law 
While fitting the goblin perspective into tangible property law is 
rather difficult, the intellectual property laws contain some closer 
parallels.  One such parallel may be found in copyright law, under 
which some of the creator’s rights limit the rights of the owner of a 
work.  For example, the owner of a painting or sculpture has the right 
to display it in his or her home or other fixed location, and has the 
right to resell it.16  However, the owner does not have the right to 
make and sell copies of the work, nor to transmit the image of the 
work over the television waves or the Internet, because the right to 
make and sell copies and make transmissions belongs to the holder of 
the copyright in the work (presumably, but not necessarily, the 
 
alienation’[] are traditionally disfavored.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 143 
(1983) (“Much of modern [real] property law operates on the assumption that freedom to 
alienate property interests which one may own is essential to the welfare of society.”). 
14 See THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 34 (1984) (“The estate for life . . . is just about what its name 
implies—an estate the duration of which is measured by a human life.”); id. at 56 (“When 
the owner of an estate transfers a lesser estate [such as a life estate], the future estate that 
the owner keeps is called a reversion.”). 
15 The exact wording of the excerpt raises the interesting question of whether the goblin 
view of ownership applies to all transactions involving goblin artifacts, or only to those 
between goblins and nongoblins.  In other words, what happens when a goblin sells an 
artistic object to another goblin?  Is that goblin free to pass it on to other goblins, or does 
the same limitation on resales apply?  Are transactions to outsiders disfavored as against 
goblin public policy?  Exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article. 
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy lawfully made 
under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that 
copy [of the work] publicly . . . to viewers present at the place where the copy is 
located.”); id. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this 
title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”). 
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creator), rather than to the purchaser.17  Similar limits on copying and 
transmission apply to other protected works.  Thus, even after a work 
leaves the artist’s hands, he or she retains a degree of control over its 
subsequent use. 
Another interesting parallel is found in section 203 of the 
Copyright Act, which provides that the creator of a work who has 
assigned the copyright in that work may terminate that assignment “at 
any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-
five years from the date of execution of the grant”18 and thus regain 
control of the rights in that work.  To emphasize the importance of 
this ongoing right, the statute makes the right inalienable: 
“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or 
to make any future grant.”19  Thus, even if the artist has explicitly 
agreed not to exercise the statutory right to terminate the assignment 
of copyright after thirty-five years, that agreement will not be 
enforced, and the artist will be able to effect the termination.  
Although the purpose of these termination rights is largely 
economic—they are intended to “better insure that authors and their 
families are able to reap a fair portion of the benefits of the author’s 
creative efforts”20—the rights still reflect a belief that a creator retains 
some connection to an artistic work even after it has passed out of his 
or her hands. 
However, there is at least one very important distinction between 
the regimes of intellectual property rights, as exemplified by the 
copyright example, and tangible property rights.  Copyright law is 
concerned only with rights in the artistic design of an object, not with 
the right to the physical possession of a tangible object embodying 
that design.21  Copyright law leaves the latter determination to the 
 
17 See id. § 106(1), (3), (5) (2006). 
18 Id. § 203(a)(3) (2006). 
19 Id. § 203(a)(5). 
20 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 472 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (further noting that 
“Congress was concerned that authors had ‘unequal bargaining power’ in negotiating 
rights with publishers and marketers ‘resulting in part from the impossibility of 
determining a work’s value until it has been exploited.’” (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 
at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740)). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of 
material object 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is 
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.  
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realm of tangible property law.22  Thus, when an artist sells a painting 
or a sculptor a statue, the tangible object passes into the purchaser’s 
possession, while the copyright in the painting or statue remains with 
the artist or sculptor.23  The purchaser is then generally free to do 
what he or she wishes with the specific piece of art purchased.24  
However, because the author retains the copyright, only he or she is 
entitled to reproduce or transmit the work, or prepare derivative 
works based on it.25  In contrast, goblins are concerned specifically 
with ownership of the tangible object itself, not merely of the rights in 
its design. 
Another difficulty relates to the example of the goblin-made sword: 
is it eligible for protection under copyright law at all?  The Copyright 
Act specifically excludes from its coverage “useful articles,”26 which 
would seem to include a sword.  However, the design for a useful 
article may be copyrightable “if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”27  Thus, if the 
design of the sword can be separated from its utilitarian purpose, it 
might be copyrightable.  Given that swords are fundamentally 
utilitarian to begin with, and that the primary value of goblin swords 
 
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord 
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the 
copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, 
does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a 
copyright convey property rights in any material object. 
Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Unless, of course, the copyright has also been transferred via contract. 
24 Subject to the limitations of the artist’s copyright in the work, as discussed supra, and 
of the artist’s moral rights in the work, as discussed infra. 
25 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2), (5) (2006).  As noted above, although the copyright holder 
retains the right to display the work, id. § 106(5), the purchaser of the work is permitted 
“to display that copy publicly . . . to viewers present at the place where the copy is 
located,” id. § 109(c) (2006). 
26 Section 101 of the Act defines “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” to include 
“works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects are concerned.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).  It goes on 
to define “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not 
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”  Id. 
27 Id.; see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 
1987) (exploring the “physical separability” and “conceptual separability” analyses for 
determining the copyrightability of design aspects of useful articles). 
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resides in their unique practical properties,28 copyright protection 
seems unlikely.  In any event, copyright law almost certainly would 
cover the goblin-made tiara that Griphook also covets.29  The 
essential point therefore holds: copyright law, in at least some cases, 
recognizes a creator’s ongoing interest in a creative work.30 
 
28 See DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 303–04 (discussing the special powers of 
goblin swords). 
29 Id. at 512, 517. 
30 Others have connected this goblin view of property to copyright law, albeit with 
different intent.  Several bloggers have compared this goblin view with that of the 
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) and the Motion Picture Association 
of America (“MPAA”) regarding digital rights management (“DRM”) of music 
recordings.  See Punditry by the Pint, Goblins and IP, http://pintpundit.com/?p=163 (Aug. 
2, 2007) (“That strikes me as the approach taken by the RIAA and MPAA toward 
copyrights . . . .”); One Floridian’s Blatherings, Of Goblins and DRM, http:// 
onefloridiansblatherings.blogspot.com/2007/07/of-goblins-and-drm.html (July 25, 2007) 
(“Wow! Goblins invented digital rights management (DRM) and run the RIAA! Who 
knew?”); Posting of Devanshu Mehta to Science Addiction Blog, Harry Potter and the 
Goblin’s Perpetual Copyright, http://www.scienceaddiction.com/2007/07/25/harry-potter-
and-the-goblins-perpetual-copyright/ (July 25th, 2007 9:42 pm) (“These goblins sound like 
our friendly neighborhood MPAA/RIAA lawyers!”); Stefan Hayden, Harry Potter 7’s 
Goblin DRM, http://www.stefanhayden.com/blog/category/books/page/2/ (July 23, 2007) 
(“This explanation of how goblins feel about their work is basically word for word how 
the RIAA and MPAA looks at the works they own.”); Reply Posting of Brian to 
Asymmetrical Information Blog, http://www.janegalt.net/archives/009921.php#131285 
(July 25, 2007 10:28 pm) (“‘[Goblins] view personal property closer to the way our 
society does intellectual property. (Minus the limited term and the ability to sell the 
underlying rights.)’  So, the way the RIAA or Disney views intellectual property?” 
(quoting a prior post)).  Others have faulted the analogy.  See Reply Posting of Kevin to 
Technology Liberation Front, The Goblin Industry Association of America, 
http://www.techliberation.com/2007/08/03 (Aug. 3, 2007 3:16 PM) (“The swords, etc. that 
goblins make are rivalrous.  In fact, the reasons for including this characterization was that 
both Harry and a goblin wanted a sword. As you know, IP is easily enjoyed/used by 
multiple people.”); Posting of jfpbookworm to Reddit.com, 
http://reddit.com/info/29i3x/comments (July 25, 2007) (response to Harry Potter and the 
Goblin’s Perpetual Copyright, stating “No, it’s not like the RIAA and MPAA. Geez, not 
every IP issue has to come back to that”); Posting of sblinn to Reddit.com, 
http://reddit.com/info/29i3x/comments (July 26, 2007) (response to Harry Potter and the 
Goblin’s Perpetual Copyright, stating “This isn’t even an IP issue, it’s a ‘real’ property 
issue, that of the transferability of real property from one person to another”); Reply 
Posting of Mike S. to Asymmetrical Information Blog, http://www.janegalt.net/ 
archives/009921.php#131293 (July 25, 2007 11:36 pm) (“Oh, the RIAA believes very 
much in the ability of creators to sell the underlying rights.”).  Still others have seen this 
passage and its follow-up as Rowling’s support for the RIAA.  See Reply Posting of JGiles 
to Science Addiction Blog, http://www.scienceaddiction.com/2007/07/25/harry-potter-
and-the-goblins-perpetual-copyright/ (July 26, 2007 at 4:54 am) (“Now try discussing how 
she’s done a bit of apologism for the bad guys in the series later, that’s the real meat of it.  
‘Oh he’s not a bad guy really, it wasn’t his fault!’  It’s interesting watching Rowling as she 
indoctrinates a whole generation of kids.  Pretty transparent if you’re looking for it.”). 
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One other potential point of divergence between goblins’ views of 
property and Muggle intellectual—and tangible—property law merits 
discussion.  Generally speaking, the rights discussed are personal to 
the creator of the work of art.31  However, as noted above, one may 
interpret the goblin view of property as not so limited: Griphook 
appears to assert an ownership interest on behalf of all goblins for any 
object of goblin origin.  While this argument lacks a strong basis in 
current intellectual property law, it actually is not unlike the 
assertions that various ethnic and national groups make on behalf of 
their cultural forebearers.  This conception of a “cultural right” 
belonging to a group is discussed in the following Part.32 
III 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW 
Moral rights present an even stronger recognition of the ongoing 
interest that the creator retains in a sold artistic object.33  In contrast 
to copyright law, which is directed primarily toward protecting the 
economic interests of the creator, moral rights law is concerned with 
protecting the “personality” of the artist.34  Like copyrights, some of 
these moral rights are limited to artistic rights and do not reach the 
artistic object itself.  Other moral rights, however, extend to at least a 
limited control over that tangible object. 
Moral rights find their roots in the continental European tradition.  
The leading country in the development of moral rights is France,35 
 
31 They may also in some cases be heritable or devisable by the creator.  See, e.g., 17 
U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2006) (describing the passage of the termination right). 
32 See infra Part III.D.  The goblin view of societal ownership may also fit into a related 
modern critique of intellectual property law generally, which asserts that “all creations are 
largely a product of communal forces,” and thus attributing them to particular individuals 
is an incoherent and improper exercise.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 10 (citing THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of 
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; James Boyle, A 
Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992)). 
33 One blog poster has also recognized this analogy.  See Posting of jfpbookworm to 
Reddit.com, http://reddit.com/info/29i3x/comments (July 25, 2007) (response to Harry 
Potter and the Goblin’s Perpetual Copyright, stating “It’s more like an extreme version of 
the (European?) conception of moral rights.”). 
34 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 519. 
35 See Amy L. Landers, The Current State of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Artists 
in the United States, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 165, 169 (1992); see also Susan P. 
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where the concept originated and is known as the droit moral, a 
phrase with no literal English translation but “‘spiritual,’ ‘non-
economic’ and ‘personal’ [right] convey something of the intended 
meaning.”36  Moral rights are an incarnation of the idea that artistic 
works are embodiments of the artist’s personality, and the works 
therefore deserve protection against appropriation or distortion by 
others.37  As such, moral rights are often deemed inalienable and 
unwaivable.38  Furthermore, “[i]n some countries moral rights are 
perpetual, lasting at least theoretically forever.”39 
Such conceptions are largely alien to the traditions of the common-
law countries such as the United States, and thus moral rights are 
relative latecomers to these countries.40  Indeed, the United States’ 
 
Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 41 
(1998). 
36 SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 456 (1987), quoted in Landers, supra note 35, at 166 n.4; see also 
Liemer, supra note 35, at 41–42 (“The French, the acknowledged leaders in this area of 
the law, generally call these ‘droits morals,’ which loosely translates as ‘moral rights.’” 
(footnote omitted)). 
37  Historically, European nations created the concept of moral rights to protect 
works of the mind by recognizing that a work embodies an author’s personality.  
Moral rights protect this right of personality by protecting the artist’s work, 
which is seen as “an emanation or manifestation of [the artist’s] personality, as 
his ‘spiritual child.’” . . . [T]he artist has a legally protectible [sic] interest if that 
work is distorted or misrepresented by another. 
Landers, supra note 35, at 169 (first alteration original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
RICKETSON, supra note 36, at 456).  Another commentator has stated the rationale for 
moral rights this way: 
 The unique relationship between an artist, the creative process, and the 
resultant art makes an artist unusually vulnerable to certain personal harms.  The 
art an artist produces is, in a sense, an extension of herself.  The [artist’s] 
connection to her art is much more personal and simply qualitatively different 
from the relationship of most other people to other objects and activities. 
Liemer, supra note 35, at 43 (footnote omitted). 
38 Liemer, supra note 35, at 44 (“In some countries, an artist cannot waive moral 
rights.”). 
39 Id. at 45 (footnote omitted) (further noting that “[i]n practical terms, they probably 
last as long as the art does”). 
40 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 519; see also, e.g., Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The 
Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 67 (2007) (“It has 
long been a basic tenet of comparative copyright theory that American and European 
copyright systems differ primarily in their attitudes towards the protection of moral rights 
of authors, evidenced by the striking discrepancy between the rights traditionally granted 
to authors under the copyright statutes of most common law jurisdictions and the rights 
granted to them under the copyright statutes of many civil law countries.”); Leimer, supra 
note 35, at 42 (“Those schooled in the United States may find moral rights to be quite a 
foreign concept.”); Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine 
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reluctance to acknowledge moral rights was a major reason that for 
nearly one hundred years it refused to join the Berne Convention, the 
primary international copyright treaty, which contains a requirement 
that member nations recognize certain moral rights in copyrighted 
works.41  The United States finally acquiesced and joined the Berne 
Convention in 1988.  But Congress did not immediately enact any 
new intellectual property laws after joining the Convention because it 
believed that an existing patchwork of laws in the Copyright and 
Lanham (Trademark) Acts, coupled with existing state-law 
protections, were sufficient to meet the Convention’s requirements.  
In 1990, however, Congress finally put moral rights on a firmer 
footing by enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”),42 which 
explicitly recognized limited moral rights for “work[s] of visual 
art.”43  In addition to this limited federal moral rights regime, many 
states recognize stronger forms of moral rights, with California being 
especially active in this area.44 
The basic moral rights, as required by the Berne Convention and 
recognized in section 106A of the Copyright Act, are the rights of 
attribution and integrity.45  Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention 
provides: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.46 
Section 106A of the Copyright Act implements this provision by 
providing protection for these two basic moral rights.  However, 
 
Visual Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267 (1992) (“The 
resale royalty [one type of moral right, discussed infra Part III.C] . . . is a foreign concept 
born of different social and legal systems, and is antithetical to the Anglo-American 
tradition of free alienability of property.”). 
41 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of July 
24, 1971 (as amended on Sept. 28, 1979), art. 6bis(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
42 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33 
(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
43 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). 
44 See Landers, supra note 35, at 181, 183. 
45 Two other rights are generally added to this list of basic rights: the right to control 
disclosure and the right of withdrawal.  See Landers, supra note 35, at 170; Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985). 
46 Berne Convention art. 6bis(1). 
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section 106A protects only “work[s] of visual art,” defined in section 
101 as: 
a painting, drawing, print, [still photographic image produced for 
exhibition purposes only], or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in 
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, 
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer 
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the 
signature or other identifying mark of the author.47 
The definition goes on to exclude “any poster, map, globe, chart, 
technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data 
base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar 
publication,” as well as “any work not subject to copyright protection 
under this title.”48 
A.  Right of Attribution 
The right of attribution is the artist’s right to have all his or her 
works and only his or her works attributed to him or her: “[T]he 
author of a work of visual art—(1) shall have the right—(A) to claim 
authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of his or her name 
as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not 
create.”49  As a corollary of this right, the author also has the right “to 
prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual 
art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”50  
 
47 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
48 Id.  Thus, as discussed supra, if the goblin sword were not protectable under 
copyright law, it would not be entitled to federal moral rights protection.  The tiara, 
however, would likely qualify as a work of visual art in the form of a sculpture. 
49 Id. § 106A(a)(1). 
50 Id. § 106A(a)(2).  Violations of VARA are treated as copyright infringements and 
therefore evoke the same remedies.  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“For purposes of this chapter 
[5—Copyright Infringement and Remedies] . . . , any reference to copyright shall be 
deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a).”).  The right of attribution 
generally is enforced by an injunction requiring the defendant either to associate or 
disassociate the artist’s name with the work as appropriate under the circumstances.  For 
example, in Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), 
the court applied the New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, which has provisions 
similar to VARA, and concluded that presenting only unrepresentative fragments of an 
artist’s work in a pamphlet presented the work in an “altered, defaced, mutilated or 
modified form.”  Id. at 134–41.  As a remedy, the court awarded: (1) an injunction 
prohibiting distribution of the pamphlet in a way that suggested that the fragments 
represented the whole of the work; (2) an injunction requiring a “corrective 
 1114 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 1101 
Although Deathly Hallows does not discuss a parallel right directly, 
Griphook’s attitude certainly suggests that the goblins would insist 
that goblin-made objects be attributed to them, and that they would 
object to non-goblin-made objects being attributed to them. 
B.  Right of Integrity 
The right of integrity is more directly parallel to the goblin 
conception of a continuing ownership interest in a tangible artistic 
object.  Under section 106A of the Copyright Act, the artist has the 
right 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work [of visual art] which would be prejudicial 
to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, 
and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and 
any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a 
violation of that right.51 
The right of integrity thus grants the creator some control over the 
tangible artistic object itself, even after it has been sold.52  The 
creator’s control is limited to prevention of certain types of 
“distortion, mutilation, or modification” and “destruction,” with 
“destruction” applicable only to “a work of recognized stature.”53  
Thus, the creator’s control is much weaker than the goblin right of 
return of the work upon the death of the purchaser.54  However, the 
right of integrity again is consistent with the goblin notion that a 
 
communication” to “disattribute” the pamphlet from the artist; and (3) damages, limited to 
nominal damages of one dollar because the artist had not shown the amount of damage to 
his reputation.  Id. at 148–49. 
51 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
52 Like the right of attribution, the right of integrity generally is enforced by an 
injunction against destruction or damage.  See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. 
Supp. 303, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining defendants from “(1) distorting, mutilating, or 
modifying plaintiffs’ art work . . . ; (2) destroying this art work; and/or (3) removing this 
art work, or any portion thereof”), rev’d on other grounds, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).  If 
the work has already been harmed or destroyed, the artist may be entitled to collect 
damages.  See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811–13 (S.D. Ind. 1998) 
(awarding artist statutory damages of $20,000 for city’s destruction of artist’s work of 
recognized stature, as well as costs and attorney’s fees), aff’d, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
53 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), (B). 
54 Although one possible remedy for threatened destruction is return of the work to the 
author. 
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creator, by virtue of the act of creation, maintains a link to and a 
degree of control over the created work, regardless of with whom the 
tangible work currently resides. 
C.  Droit de Suite 
One final moral right that deserves mention is the droit de suite, 
also known as the resale royalty; indeed, this right perhaps comes the 
closest to the goblin conception of property, or at least to the 
individualized version Bill describes.  Pursuant to the droit de suite, 
an artist is entitled to a portion of the proceeds any time his or her fine 
artwork is resold.55  These resale royalties are typically limited to 
works of fine art sold for above a threshold price, and they can be 
based on the entire resale price or on only the increase in value.56  
This right again is strongly rooted in the continental European 
tradition57 and has had difficulty gaining traction in the common-law 
countries.  Different rationales have been presented for the droit de 
suite, including that the right to profit from resales gives artists an 
increased incentive to produce works of fine art;58 creators of works 
of fine art are at a disadvantage compared to authors and composers, 
who can profit by selling many copies of their works;59 fine artists 
enhance their reputations, and hence the value of their existing works, 
 
55 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 933. 
56 See Channah Farber, Advancing the Arts Community in New Mexico Through Moral 
Rights and Droit de Suite: The International Impetus and Implications of Preemption 
Analysis, 36 N.M. L. REV. 713, 720 (2006) (“German artists are given one-fourth of the 
difference between the present and prior selling price, as opposed to a set percentage of the 
resale price, as in France.” (footnote omitted)); Alderman, supra note 40, at 279. 
57 See Alderman, supra note 40, at 276 (“This [droit de suite] concept fits easily within 
the European natural law systems . . . .”).  The European Union has issued a directive 
requiring that all its member countries recognize such a right.  Council Directive 2001/84, 
2001 O.J. (L 272) 32–36, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0084:EN:NOT (last visited June 4, 2009) [hereinafter 
E.U. Droit de Suite Directive]. 
58 See Alderman, supra note 40, at 268 (“Since it has been argued that works of fine art 
are exploited with each sale, whether or not there is a profit, resale royalties rest on the 
desire to encourage artistic production by guaranteeing creators compensation, as with 
other economic rights.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 272–73 (“One can argue that the 
potential for increased remuneration is a potent incentive for further creation.”). 
59 See id. at 273–74 (“Authors and composers receive royalties through reproduction 
and performance rights for all the copies of their works that are exploited.  Visual artists, 
on the other hand, are paid only for the initial sale of their works and have commercially 
insignificant reproduction rights.  And unfortunately, they lose their most remunerative 
right—that of public display—once they sell their creations.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
id. at 269–70 (attributing this rationale to French law). 
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by producing later works, and they are therefore entitled to 
compensation for this increase in value;60 and allowing the purchaser 
to reap all the benefit of the increased value of the work is a form of 
unjust enrichment that comes at the expense of the original artist.61 
In the United States, only California has fully recognized such a 
right, in the form of the Resale Royalty Act.62  The California Resale 
Royalty Act applies to works of “fine art,” defined to be “an original 
painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass.”63  
Under the Act, “[w]henever a work of fine art is sold . . . , the seller or 
the seller’s agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to 
such artist’s agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale.”64  The right 
is inalienable65 and persists for the life of the artist, then “inure[s] to 
his or her heirs, legatees, or personal representative” for an additional 
twenty years.66  However, the right is limited and does not apply to 
“the resale of a work of fine art for a gross sales price of less than one 
 
60 See id. at 270 (“The artist’s royalty in Germany is premised on the belief that the 
increased value of a creation was always latent in it, and that increases in individual works 
are also due to the artist’s continuing body of work.  Thus, the increase in value in a 
particular work over time is what the artist should have received originally.  Artists are 
exploited, in this view, because a work’s true value is not realized until many years after 
its original sale, and without resale royalties the creators do not share in any appreciation.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
61 See id. at 271 (“In Belgium, the contract principles of changed circumstances and 
unjust enrichment underlie the royalty right.  Based on the continuing relationship between 
the artist and those who purchase his work, it is believed that a subsequent seller should 
not benefit unjustly from any increased value in an artist’s work.  Changed circumstances 
and unjust enrichment presuppose that value increases are not the result of any specific 
activity or ability of the owner of a work who, therefore, should not benefit at the creator’s 
expense.” (footnote omitted)).  Alderman is generally critical of all these views, and 
opposed to the resale right.  See generally id.; see also Farber, supra note 56, at 731 
(discussing criticism of California’s droit de suite law (citing 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN 
& ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 233, 238 (2d ed. 1987))). 
62 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2007).  Puerto Rico also recognizes this right.  See 
Farber, supra note 56, at 731 (citing 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 1401).  Georgia recognizes a 
limited form of the right in art purchased by the state, if the right is provided for by 
contract.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 8-5-7(a)(3) (2008) (providing that the artist retains, “[i]f 
provided by written contract, the right to receive a specified percentage of the proceeds if 
the work of art is subsequently sold by the state to a third party other than as part of the 
sale of the building in which the work of art is located”). 
63 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(2). 
64 Id. § 986(a).  The obligation is on the seller or his or her agent to “withhold 5 percent 
of the amount of the sale, locate the artist and pay the artist.”  Id. § 986(a)(1). 
65 Id. § 986(a) (“The right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the 
amount of such sale may be waived only by a contract in writing providing for an amount 
in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale.”). 
66 Id. § 986(a)(7). 
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thousand dollars”67 or to “resale of the work of fine art for a gross 
sales price less than the purchase price paid by the seller.”68 
The droit de suite thus incorporates many of the features that Bill 
attributes to the goblin view of ownership interests in works of art.  
The creator maintains an ongoing economic interest in the work,69 as 
subsequent sales of the work require a direct payment to the creator.70  
Since goblins “consider our habit of keeping goblin-made objects, 
passing them from wizard to wizard without further payment, little 
more than theft,”71 a system that requires payment of a royalty on 
each such transfer fits splendidly with their view of property, 
although they would probably want more than California’s five-
percent royalty. 
D.  Cultural Rights 
Recently, interest had been growing in a proposed collective moral 
right, termed a “cultural right.”  Under the aegis of such a cultural 
right, Native Americans have demanded the return of artistic and 
cultural artifacts residing in U.S. museums, and the Greek 
government has demanded that the British government return the 
“Elgin Marbles” friezes and statuary taken from the Parthenon in 
1806.72  In these cases, it is not the actual artists, or even their direct 
 
67 Id. § 986(b)(2). 
68 Id. § 986(b)(4).  Note that if the sale price is greater than the purchase price by less 
than five percent, the seller will actually take a loss on the transaction. 
69 See Alderman, supra note 40, at 267 (“The resale royalty, or droit de suite, . . . 
[posits] a continuing remunerative relationship between a visual artist and his creation, 
surviving the sale of the material object embodying the work . . . .”); see also id. at 276 
(“This [droit de suite] concept fits easily within the European natural law systems that 
recognize a continuing relationship between an artist and his work, even after sale.  
Consistent with this view, possession of art is not like owning a widget: even after a work 
is sold it remains under the influence of its creator.” (footnote omitted)). 
70 Although by its terms the Resale Royalty Act applies only to actual resales (and 
exchanges for other fine art, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b)(5)), the logic of the Act 
suggests that it should apply to any transfer of the property, such as via a will, just as tax 
laws do. 
71 DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 517. 
72 See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of 
Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995); Sarah Harding, Value, 
Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 293 (1999) [hereinafter Harding, 
Cultural Heritage] (“The work that has been done on understanding and justifying 
repatriation, while addressing the important connection between community and culture, 
tends to focus on the rights of cultural groups or the political value of cultural heritage.  
The advocates of this approach argue that the disposition of cultural heritage is an issue for 
culturally affiliated groups without interference from others.”); Sarah Harding, Justifying 
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descendants, who are making the claim; instead, a government or 
activist group is asserting the claim on behalf of the ethnic or national 
group of which the artists were members.  The cultural right 
postulates that certain older artifacts are so tightly linked to particular 
cultures that they should be returned to the current-day members of 
those cultures, regardless of who owns the artifact under the 
traditional laws of tangible property.  Thus, even if a museum or 
collector has an iron-clad claim of ownership in an important cultural 
object, with a chain of legitimate transfers of title,73 that object should 
nevertheless be returned to the descendants of the originating group. 
Commentators have proposed various definitions for cultural 
property, accompanied by a similar variety of rationales for its 
protection.  According to Professor Patty Gerstenblith, 
“cultural property” refers to those objects that are the product of a 
particular group or community and embody some expression of that 
group’s identity, regardless of whether the object has achieved some 
universal recognition of its value beyond that group. . . . 
 . . . .  
 To achieve the purposes of the personality theory of property 
ownership [adopted in the article] and to ensure that the group has 
 
Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723, 743–73 (1997) 
[hereinafter Harding, Native American Cultural Property] (discussing possible 
philosophical bases for recognizing cultural rights); Anna Kingsbury, Protecting 
Indigenous Knowledge and Culture Through Indigenous Communal Moral Rights in 
Copyright Law: Is Australia Leading the Way?, 12 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 162 (2006); John 
Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1989) (arguing for cultural rights to create “property for 
grouphood,” by analogy to Margaret Radin’s “property for personhood” (citing Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)), and also arguing 
that rights based on this theory should be inalienable); Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the 
Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63 (1993) (collecting and 
summarizing U.S. laws protecting cultural property); Michael J. Reppas II, The 
Deflowering of the Parthenon: A Legal and Moral Analysis on Why the “Elgin Marbles” 
Must Be Returned to Greece, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 911 (1999).  
But see Harding, Native American Cultural Property, supra, at 750–53 (criticizing 
Moustakas).  Professor Harding also cites the Dead Seas Scrolls as another example of 
cultural property.  See Harding, Cultural Heritage, supra, at 295 & n.13. 
73 Such an orderly transfer of title is not typical for the works usually under 
discussion—the Elgin Marbles in particular have a rather dicey history.  See John Henry 
Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1881–84, 1895–
1902 (1985) (discussing the history of the Elgin Marbles and the complexities in 
determining whether Britain can legitimately claim title to the pieces).  Gryffindor’s sword 
is the subject of similar discussions regarding its rightful ownership.  See DEATHLY 
HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 505–08 (goblins and wizards arguing over whether Gryffindor 
commissioned the sword from the goblins or whether he simply stole it from them). 
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the opportunity to define itself autonomously, the cultural group 
must provide the definition of its cultural property.74 
She then goes on to identify the grounds for protecting such property: 
 Once a group designates items of property as cultural property, 
the rights of cultural groups may be founded on three ideas.  First, 
because the identity of the group is bound up in the object (and 
similarly, the identity of the object relies on recognition by the 
group), the group acquires ownership rights over that object.  
Second, because the property is so closely tied to the identity of the 
group, it should be inalienable “because future generations are 
unable to consent to transactions that threaten their existence as a 
group.”  Finally, group ownership may also be premised on a 
Lockean theory.  Cultural groups have rights in their cultural 
property because such property is the product of the group.75 
The most significant international treaty on cultural property, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
(“UNESCO Convention”),76 states “[f]or the purposes of this 
Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property which, on 
religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State 
as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, 
art or science and which belongs to [particular designated] 
categories.”77  The designated categories include specimen 
collections, artifacts of historical interest, archaeological discoveries, 
parts of monuments, artistic works and manuscripts, and archives.78 
The Preamble to the UNESCO Convention lays out the 
considerations that justify the protection of cultural property: “[T]he 
 
74 Gerstenblith, supra note 72, at 569–70. 
75 Id. at 570 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of 
Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural 
Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 249, 263 (1993)).  Professor Gerstenblith 
concludes her article with a model statute for the comprehensive protection of cultural 
property in the United States.  See id. at 641–70; see also id. app. A at 673–88 (draft text 
of a Model Statute for the Treatment and Protection of Cultural and Archaeological 
Resources). 
76 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234–36, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 
289, 289–90 (1971), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13039 
[hereinafter UNESCO Convention].  The history of the UNESCO Convention is discussed 
further infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
77 UNESCO Convention, supra note 76, art. 1. 
78 See id. 
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interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural 
and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization 
of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual 
respect and appreciation among nations,” and “cultural property 
constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national 
culture, and that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to 
the fullest possible information regarding its origin, history and 
traditional setting.”79  The Preamble then concludes that “it is 
incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing 
within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine 
excavation, and illicit export,” and that “to avert these dangers, it is 
essential for every State to become increasingly alive to the moral 
obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all 
nations.”80  Article 2 of the Convention goes on to declare: 
The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit 
import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property is one 
of the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of 
the countries of origin of such property and that international co-
operation constitutes one of the most efficient means of protecting 
each country’s cultural property against all the dangers resulting 
therefrom.81 
Article 3 contains the primary substantive provision of the 
Convention: “The import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural 
property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this 
Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be illicit.”82  The rest 
of the Convention then specifies the conditions under which the 
import and export of cultural property is legal or illegal.83 
Professor John Merryman states the definition this way: “The term 
[‘cultural property’] refers to objects that have artistic, ethnographic, 
archaeological, or historical value.”84  He adds that “[m]ost nations 
control cultural property in the interest of its retention, preservation, 
study, enjoyment, and exploitation.”85  Professor Merryman takes a 
 
79 See id. Preamble. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. art. 2. 
82 Id. art. 3. 
83 See id. arts. 4–26. 
84 Merryman, supra note 73, at 1888. 
85 Id.  Professor Merryman explores this notion further, explaining that 
These interests may reinforce each other: for example, Mayan sites in Mexico are 
more likely to be preserved if monumental Mayan sculptures cannot be exported 
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different view from most commentators in the cultural rights field on 
why and how to protect cultural property.  Instead of a “cultural 
nationalism” view of the rights, under which a culture or nation has a 
group right to demand the return of its cultural property,86 he favors 
“cultural internationalism,” under which cultural property should be 
protected because it is important to the cultural identity of all 
humankind, not just to the group that created it.87  On this theory, 
there is no particular rationale for favoring the originating culture 
over any other; rather, the important consideration is who is in the 
best position to preserve the property.88 
Another view of cultural rights, which is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the previous views, is that they are needed to fill 
gaps in the coverage of traditional copyright and moral rights laws.89  
In many indigenous cultures, knowledge and creation are viewed as 
communal in nature, and therefore no individual “author” can be 
identified, as required for both copyrights and moral rights.90  Further, 
many indigenous works are not written or otherwise “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression,”91 again as required by copyright and 
moral rights law.92  In response, there have been proposals to create 
what have been termed “Indigenous Communal Moral Rights.”93  
 
to foreign markets.  There are situations, however, in which the preservation of 
cultural objects is actually endangered by retentive legislation: objects that would 
be well-housed and preserved abroad are allowed to deteriorate in warehouses or 
inadequately maintained and staffed museums or, often worse, at unprotected and 
unexcavated sites at home.  In such cases the retention and preservation interests 
work against each other. 
Id. at 1888–89 (footnote omitted). 
86 See id. at 1911–16. 
87 See id. at 1916–21. 
88 See id.  He therefore favors a principle of “repose,” under which an artifact should 
remain where it currently resides unless there is a good reason to move it.  See id. at 1911; 
see also id. at 1921 (applying cultural internationalism and repose to conclude that the 
Elgin Marbles should remain in Britain). 
89 See Kingsbury, supra note 72, at 163–64 & passim. 
90 See id. at 163. 
91 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  Section 101 defines “fixed”: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a 
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or 
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
92 See Kingsbury, supra note 72, at 163. 
93 See id. at 168–70 (discussing proposed legislation in Australia that would recognize 
rights under this name).  Although the author criticizes the Australian legislation for being 
too limited, she does note that: 
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Such proposals recognize the communal nature of these creations and 
protect them with communal moral rights. 
The cultural moral right is not necessarily in line with Bill’s 
assertion of what goblins believe, in that his description reflects a 
primarily economic motive in wanting another fee paid for each 
transfer of the artistic object.  Nevertheless, the right is perfectly 
consistent with what Griphook demands when he says that the sword 
“is a lost treasure, a masterpiece of goblinwork!  It belongs with the 
goblins!”94  He is asserting the right in what he sees as an important 
cultural artifact, the sword (and, presumably, the tiara), on behalf of 
the goblins as a cultural or racial group, much as the Native 
Americans demand the return of tribal artifacts on behalf of the tribe 
or the Greek government demands return of the Elgin Marbles on 
behalf of the Greek people.  Thus, Griphook appears to be demanding 
recognition of the goblins’ cultural rights in their historical artifacts. 
IV 
ARE WE BECOMING GOBLINS? 
The current law of intellectual property, and even more so the law 
of moral rights, thus bears some significant parallels to the goblin 
view of property, albeit with some important differences.  These 
parallels raise the interesting question of whether we are in the 
process of eroding away those differences and moving toward a more 
“goblinish” view of artistic property. 
The overall thrust in intellectual property clearly has been in the 
direction of expanding intellectual property rights, especially in the 
area of copyrights and other artistic rights.95  The same trend appears 
 
Despite the limitations of the draft Bill, Australia has taken an important 
initiative in pioneering Indigenous Communal Moral Rights.  Australia has 
effectively reconceptualised moral rights (admittedly in this limited context), so 
that they protect not the author but the community.  This is a concept far 
removed from the original author-centred notion of moral rights in civil law 
systems.  It demonstrates the flexibility of the moral rights framework, and its 
ability to deal with cultural rather than economic harm. 
Id. at 171 (footnote omitted); see also Reppas, supra note 72, at 932–34 (arguing that the 
Greeks have a group moral right of integrity in the Parthenon that requires Britain to return 
the Elgin Marbles so that the monument may be restored properly). 
94 DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 506. 
95 Along with many others, the author of this Article has made this point before.  See 
Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate 
Researchers at State Universities from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 
WASH. L. REV. 275, 357 & n.443 (providing examples, including the increase in copyright 
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in moral rights;96 indeed, the United States did not formally recognize 
such rights until VARA in 1990.  Furthermore, many commentators 
argue that even VARA does not meet the requirements of the Berne 
Convention, and that the United States therefore should expand its 
recognition of moral rights to align more completely with the 
continental moral rights tradition.97  More states are creating their 
own moral rights regimes, or are expanding existing regimes.98  If this 
 
term); id. at 360–63 (discussing copyright specifically, and citing such examples as the 
addition of protection for sound recordings and architectural works, new rights in digital 
sound recordings, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
96 See Rigamonti, supra note 40, at 67 (noting that the article explores the reasons 
behind “[t]he recent wave of moral rights legislation in common law countries”); Liemer, 
supra note 35, at 42 (“In the United States, moral rights are in a much earlier state of 
development and are currently undergoing an important transition.  This transition may, in 
part, reveal changing cultural values . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Farber, supra note 56, at 
747 (“As internationalization of the art world continues and the intellectual property law in 
the United States adapts accordingly, state [moral rights] law will continue to develop as 
well.”).  As noted above, the European Union has issued a directive requiring all its 
members to adopt the droit de suite.  See E.U. Droit de Suite Directive, supra note 57. 
[T]he explosive growth of the Internet and online services and technological 
tools that allow users to access and manipulate creative works directly has 
resulted in growing international pressures on the U.K. and the U.S. to move 
toward greater recognition of, and respect for, moral rights, including for musical 
works.  In accordance with these aforementioned international agreements, other 
common law nations, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have already 
adopted broader statutory schemes granting moral rights for creative works, 
including moral rights for music. 
Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the 
United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New Performances 
Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 215–16 (2006).  It may be that this forced imposition 
of the droit de suite on a reluctant Great Britain is behind Rowling’s exposition of goblin 
property rules.  Even in France, the leader in the area of moral rights, the concept is only a 
little more than 100 years old.  See Landers, supra note 35, at 169. 
97 See generally, e.g., Landers, supra note 35 (criticizing various sections of VARA as 
too limited); Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual 
Artists Rights Act to Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 UMKC L. REV. 
897 (2007); Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the 
Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105 
(2006); Sarah C. Anderson, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doctrine of 
Moral Rights Be Extended?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869 (2006); 
see also Farber, supra note 56, at 741 (arguing that “[t]here is a strong possibility that 
Congress may indeed enact a federal resale royalty law,” in light of recent harmonization 
of the right in the European Union). 
98 Compare Landers, supra note 35, at 183 & n.124 (identifying eleven states with 
moral-rights legislation prior to the enactment of VARA in 1990), with 6 ALEXANDER 
LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING & ARTS § 
16:103 & n.1 (3d ed. updated August 2007) (identifying fourteen states—California, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—with moral-rights 
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trend continues, it is likely to take us ever closer to a goblin-like view 
of artistic property, in which the moral rights of the creator overcome 
the traditional property rights of the purchaser. 
What would be the implications of a full-fledged goblinish rights 
regime, in which the seller is entitled to the return of the work upon 
the death of the purchaser?  One issue with such a regime would be 
the scope of the works covered.  The conventional moral rights 
provisions are all focused on protecting the creative work of a single 
artist, or at most a small group of artists; indeed, the VARA definition 
of a protected “work of visual art” specifically excludes any corporate 
“work made for hire” from its scope.99  Thus, a company like 
Tiffany’s would not be able to regain possession of one of its fine 
necklaces or bracelets upon the death of the purchaser.  Instead, the 
sort of works that might be included in such a regime would most 
likely be limited to highly individual pieces of fine art or 
craftsmanship—like a particularly fine sword or tiara. 
Such a regime certainly would raise some interesting economic 
questions.  If purchasers of works of art knew that the transactions 
were more like rentals than traditional purchase agreements, then they 
almost certainly would not be willing to pay the same price for the 
works as they would for an outright ownership interest.  In this sense, 
such a view of artistic property rights might actually be 
disadvantageous to the artist, as he or she would receive less money 
up front.  In theory, this disadvantage would be overcome by the right 
to make subsequent sales once the purchaser returns the property.  
However, such subsequent sales are far from a sure thing—the work 
might not change hands during the artist’s lifetime, and even if it did, 
very few works increase in value or even hold their original value 
over time because fashions and tastes change.100 
A goblinish regime would also raise some profound practical 
problems.  As long as the artist was alive at the time of return of the 
work, then identifying the holder of the right would likely be 
 
legislation in 2007), and Farber, supra note 56, at 731–32, 747 (identifying Montana and 
Utah as also having recognized limited moral rights, but omitting Illinois, Nevada, and 
Oregon; also arguing that “New Mexico should consider expanding its moral rights law to 
encompass a broader range of subject matter and to apply in contexts other than works of 
art that are incorporated into public buildings”).  This number probably is less than it 
might otherwise have been because VARA includes a preemption provision that may have 
discouraged states from passing their own regimes.  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (2006). 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
100 Similar arguments have been advanced against the droit de suite.  See, e.g., 
Alderman, supra note 40. 
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relatively easy.101  But what if the artist had died in the interim?  If 
the right was perpetual,102 the passage of time would make tracking 
down the original creator, and then the successors in interest, 
progressively more difficult.  And who would those successors in 
interest be?  Traditional moral rights are inalienable, in large part due 
to their fundamental link to the personality of the creator, but also 
because making the rights freely assignable would effectively defeat 
their purpose—the purchaser of the work could, as a term of the 
purchase, demand transfer of the moral rights as well.103  Indeed, the 
rights afforded by section 203 of the Copyright Act (providing for the 
termination of copyright assignment agreements) are not even 
devisable—they pass to the heirs of the artist according to strict rules 
spelled out in the statute.104  Tracking the creator’s rights through 
generations of the creator’s descendents would likely prove 
impossible.105 
One way around this difficulty is to make the right an individual 
right for the lifetime of the creator, plus perhaps some additional 
limited time,106 and then make it a collective cultural right thereafter.  
Griphook’s actual claim on the goblin sword would appear to be of 
this collective nature—he asserts the right on behalf of the race of 
goblins because he is a member of that race, not because he is a 
descendant of the actual creator.  As noted above, such a claim is 
consistent with many forms of the proposed cultural moral right.  In 
 
101 Although finding him or her may not be so easy.  For example, note the difficulty 
created by so-called “orphan works,” works that are still under copyright but for which the 
owner of the copyright cannot be found.  With no way to contact the copyright owner, 
potential users are left uncertain of their ability to use the work without liability.  See 
generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-
report-full.pdf. 
102 The goblin right appears to be perpetual—as noted above, the sword at issue was at 
least 1000 years old (and the tiara is of a similar age), but Griphook asserted that it still 
belonged to the goblins. 
103 They are, however, in some cases waivable.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2006) 
(providing for written waiver of the rights granted in that section). 
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2006). 
105 In this sense, a corporate right might actually be more suited to this goblin property 
right because corporations have ongoing existences unrelated to the Muggles who own and 
operate them.  On the other hand, corporations also dissolve and disappear with some 
regularity, which would raise even more complex questions about who would qualify as 
their “descendants.” 
106 As with the copyright, which extends for the life of the creator plus seventy years, 
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006), or the California resale royalty, which extends for the life of the 
creator plus twenty years, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(7) (West 2007). 
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the modern world of globalism and increased sensitivity to other 
cultures, the recognition of such a right seems increasingly plausible.  
Indeed, recognition of cultural property is perhaps the most rapidly 
expanding area of moral rights law.107 
In fact, recognition of such a moral claim occurred recently, albeit 
by private parties rather than a governmental body.  Yale University 
recognized the claim of the Peruvian government to cultural artistic 
objects, including “silver statues, jewelry, [and] musical 
instruments,”108 that had been collected from the Machu Picchu site 
in Peru and were residing in Yale’s Peabody Museum.109  Yale 
agreed to return the artifacts to Peru for display in a new museum to 
be built near the Maccu Piccu site.  According to the parties’ press 
release: 
Yale will acknowledge Peru’s title to all the excavated objects 
including the fragments, bones and specimens from Machu Picchu.  
Simultaneously, in the spirit of collaboration, Peru will share with 
Yale rights in the research collection, part of which will remain at 
Yale as objects of ongoing research.  Once the Museum and 
Research Center is ready for operation in late 2009, the museum 
 
107 See, e.g., Harding, Cultural Heritage, supra note 72, at 296–97 (“There are an 
increasing number of examples of cooperation between museums and claimants and 
between collecting and source nations.  This cooperation is founded at least partially on a 
mutual understanding of the significance of certain objects and a sense of obligation to the 
integrity of the objects themselves.” (footnotes omitted)); Reppas, supra note 72, at 959 
(“An emerging norm in contemporary international law, in regards to the return of Cultural 
Property to its countries of origin, may be seen through an analysis of the numerous 
international treaties and agreements which expressly deal with this subject.  These 
agreements show a trend in the world community to recognize the right of countries of 
origin to repatriate their Cultural Property which has been taken abroad, by establishing a 
procedure for and providing a means by which such property is returned.”); Gerstenblith, 
supra note 72, at 565 (“[P]rotection of our indigenous cultures has become progressively 
stronger over the course of this century . . . .”); Phelan, supra note 72, at 64 (“[I]n recent 
years Congress and state legislatures have recognized the importance of identifying and 
preserving our cultural heritage and have enacted legislation to initiate and promote such 
an endeavor [i.e., to preserve objects and monuments of artistic, historical, literary, and 
anthropological interest].”); see also Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal 
Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293 (1994) (proposing 
further expansion of cultural rights in the realm of intangible cultural property). 
108 Diane Orson, Morning Edition: Yale Returns Peruvian Antiquities (NPR radio 
broadcast Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=14495762. 
109 The Peruvian government also asserted a more traditional legal claim to the property 
based on agreements signed at the time the artifacts were excavated.  Such claims are 
common in cultural rights cases, including that of the Elgin Marbles.  However, the rules 
governing ownership of excavated artifacts in this older time were rather fluid, as are 
details of what actually went on so long ago, and so the moral rights claim is often more 
clear-cut. 
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quality objects will return to Peru along with a portion of the 
research collection.110 
Yale President Richard Levin stated that the arrangement was a 
“model for the handling of cultural artifacts that are important for 
scholarship on the one hand and important sources of national pride 
for the home country. . . . The key breakthrough, of course, is that we 
can at once recognize that the Peruvians are the owners of this 
material.”111  On the other side, Jose Keplan, a representative for the 
local government of Machu Picchu who was an advisor to the 
Peruvian negotiators, explicitly invoked the language of cultural 
rights, reportedly saying “repatriation of the antiquities goes beyond 
the technicalities of who possesses property. . . . It boils down to the 
ethical rights of the country of origin.”112  The parties went so far as 
to propose, “[t]his understanding represents a new model of 
international cooperation providing for the collaborative stewardship 
of cultural and natural treasures.”113  The parties thus recognized the 
growing importance of cultural rights and the trend toward 
recognizing the rights that cultural groups have in their artifacts. 
Even earlier, the U.S. Congress recognized the cultural claims of 
Native American tribes in the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).114 
[NAGPRA] was enacted on November 16, 1990, as a way to correct 
past abuses to, and guarantee protection for, the human remains and 
cultural objects of Native American tribal culture.  The Act 
addresses two main objectives: to protect Native American or 
Native Hawaiian ownership rights to items of cultural significance 
to them and burial sites on federal and tribal lands, and to provide 
for the repatriation of culturally significant items currently held by 
federal agencies and museums.115 
 
110 News Release, Yale University, Joint Statement by the Government of Peru and 
Yale University (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://opa.yale.edu/news/article 
.aspx?id=2376. 
111 Orson, supra note 108. 
112 Id. 
113 News Release, supra note 110. 
114 Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
3001–3013, 18 U.S.C. § 1170); see generally Harding, Native American Cultural 
Property, supra note 72 (using cultural rights theory to justify NAGPRA).  For a synopsis 
of all U.S. laws relating to preservation of our cultural heritage, including NAGPRA, see 
Phelan, supra note 72, and Gerstenblith, supra note 72, at 586–641. 
115 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applicability of 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001–3013 and 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1170), 173 A.L.R. FED. 585, 585 (2001) (citation omitted). 
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NAGPRA provides that “[t]he ownership or control of Native 
American cultural items which are excavated or discovered on 
Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990, shall be [with Native 
American tribes].”116  The primary focus of NAGPRA is human 
remains and associated funerary objects, but it also protects “cultural 
items” generally, defined to include “unassociated funerary objects,” 
“sacred objects,” and “cultural patrimony.”117  Furthermore, federal 
agencies and museums with collections of “Native American human 
remains and associated funerary objects” are required to inventory 
their holdings and, if possible, “identify the geographical and cultural 
affiliation of such item.”118  If agencies and museums are able to 
identify these affiliations, they must “upon the request of a known 
lineal descendant of the Native American or of the tribe or 
organization . . . expeditiously return such remains and associated 
funerary objects.”119  Thus, the United States has formally recognized 
cultural rights for artistic objects created by Native American tribes, 
at least with respect to items discovered on federal lands or held by 
federal agencies or museums. 120 
The issue of cultural property has also been addressed at the 
international level, resulting in a series of accords regarding the 
 
116 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2006).  The statute then provides a hierarchy for determining 
which particular tribe or group receives the ownership right.  See id. 
117 Id. § 3001(3) (2006).  “Cultural patrimony” is defined to mean: 
an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to 
the Native American group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an 
individual Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, 
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of whether or not the 
individual is a member of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and 
such object shall have been considered inalienable by such Native American 
group at the time the object was separated from such group. 
Id. § 3001(3)(D). 
118 Id. § 3003(a) (2006). 
119 Id. § 3005(a)(1) (2006). 
120 Australia and New Zealand, two other common-law countries, also have dealt with 
the issue of the cultural rights of indigenous peoples, with Australia going so far as to 
propose the creation of “Indigenous Communal Moral Rights.”  See generally Kingsbury, 
supra note 72 (discussed supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text).  The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has also worked on the issue of cultural 
property at the international level, issuing a set of draft guidelines.  See WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
FOLKLORE, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS 
OF FOLKLORE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES (2006), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_9/wipo_grtkf_ic_9_4.pdf. 
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treatment of such property.  The oldest of these treaties is the 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, which was intended to prevent the seizure and/or 
destruction of important monuments and other cultural property 
during wartime.121  This treaty was followed by what is probably the 
most significant international treaty on cultural property, the 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 
enacted in 1970.122  The UNESCO Convention requires member 
nations to ban the export of cultural property without the 
authorization of the country of origin.  The United States ratified the 
UNESCO Convention with the Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act in 1983, which permits the president to enter into 
bilateral agreements to implement the export restrictions of the 
UNESCO Convention.123 
Other international agreements aim to foster international 
cooperation to protect cultural rights using a variety of different, 
largely hortatory, approaches.  These agreements include the 
Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage124 and the UNIDROIT Convention on the International 
Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.125  More 
recent attempts include the Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage,126 the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,127 and the 
 
121 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13637.  The convention has an accompanying protocol, available at http://portal 
.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15391, which was updated in 1999, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15207.  The United States is a signatory to 
the Convention but not to either protocol. 
122 UNESCO Convention, supra note 76.  The provisions of the UNESCO Convention 
are discussed supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
123 Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 302, 96 Stat. 2329 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2613 (2006)). 
124 Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37. 
125 June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.  The possible application of these agreements to the 
Elgin Marbles is discussed in Reppas, supra note 72, at 959–61.  Reppas also argues that 
“Collectively, . . . these treaties, in conjunction with other international agreements, 
establish a peremptory norm in contemporary international law which cannot be ignored 
by any country, irrespective of whether or not they are a party to these agreements.”  Id. at 
962. 
126 Nov. 2, 2001, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13520. 
127 Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17716. 
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Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions.128  Indeed, cultural property has become so 
significant a part of the international legal landscape that it now has 
its own dedicated journal, the International Journal of Cultural 
Property.129 
However, broad cultural rights also present some practical 
difficulties.  One such difficulty lies in the effect on the future 
viability of museums.  The collections of many important museums 
would be drastically impoverished if cultural rights forced museums 
to submit to the demands of governments and ethnic groups for the 
return of their cultural artifacts.130  Thus, increasing the recognition 
of the importance of other cultures may create the ironic result of 
decreasing the ability to learn about those cultures because the decline 
of museums’ collections would close a major cultural educational 
avenue.131 
Broad cultural rights also may implicate constitutional rights of 
private citizens.  If the U.S. government extended the NAGPRA 
concept to create a similar action for artifacts discovered on private 
lands or held by private citizens, it would have to contend with the 
argument that such an action amounts to a taking under the Fifth 
 
128 Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038.  A 
listing of the international agreements regarding cultural property, with links to the text of 
the agreements themselves, may be found at the UNESCO web site, http://portal.unesco 
.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html 
(last visited July 8, 2009). 
129 See http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JCP. 
130 See Merryman, supra note 73, at 1895.  According to Professor Merryman: 
[T]he [Elgin] Marbles dramatically illustrate an important fact: the Metropolitan 
Museum in New York, the British Museum in London, the Louvre in Paris, the 
Hermitage in Leningrad and indeed all of the great Western museums contain 
vast collections of works from other parts of the world.  If the principle were 
established that works of foreign origin should be returned to their sources, as 
Third World nations increasingly demand in UNESCO and other international 
fora, the holdings of the major Western museums would be drastically depleted. 
Id.; see also Reppas, supra note 72, at 978–79 (acknowledging the risk, but dismissing its 
importance). 
131 There is an international interest in the accessibility of cultural property to all 
people.  That policy is advanced by distribution, rather than retention in one 
place, of the works of a culture.  If all the works of the great artists of classical 
Athens were returned to and kept there, the rest of the world would be culturally 
impoverished. 
Merryman, supra note 73, at 1920–21 (footnote omitted). 
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Amendment.132  This possibility raises the general issue of 
compensation to the current owner: Should the cultures demanding 
return of their artifacts be required to pay some approximation of 
market value (assuming such a value could even theoretically be 
determined for unique antiquities) to get back the items?  Or should 
these cultures have an absolute right in the object that entitles them to 
return without payment? 
Another important issue is time limits: How old does an object 
have to get before it becomes a “cultural artifact”?  At what point 
should the cultural right be recognized?  Declaring an object of 
relatively recent vintage, whose creator is still alive or has been dead 
a relatively short time, a “cultural artifact” might seem strange, unless 
the object had attained some sort of special recognition or status in the 
culture.  On the other hand, works of indigenous peoples following 
ancient methods of craftsmanship might quickly attain the “cultural 
artifact” status. 
Finally, there is the issue of who then controls the collective 
cultural right.  The idea of a cultural right exercised by a cultural 
group may be acceptable in the case of indigenous peoples with a 
strong cultural identity, such as Native American tribes.  The idea 
may also be acceptable in a case such as the Greek government 
claiming the return of Greek artifacts.  However, the concept becomes 
more elusive when the creator does not clearly belong to a particular 
group—for example, are there such things as “U.S. artifacts”? 133 
While we may be becoming more goblinish in recognizing ongoing 
rights in artistic objects, including allowing the artist to collect a 
commission on subsequent resale of the work, practical and social 
considerations suggest that we are unlikely to go as far as granting 
creators permanent personal rights that lets them reclaim their objects 
after a sale or other transfer.  However, we may be moving closer to 
 
132 See Gerstenblith, supra note 72, at 661–70 (discussing the takings issue and 
exploring rationales under which the repatriation of cultural property may be deemed not 
to be a taking). 
133 But see John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, the Public Interest, 
and Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477 (2003).  Nivala claims 
that the Barnes Collection of art, as a complete set, is the cultural property of the United 
States and that breaking up the collection would cause cultural harm.  He argues that it 
should therefore be protected as an intact set via some form of cultural rights, which he 
calls a “collective droit patrimoine.”  Id. at 481.  The French droit patrimoine corresponds 
to what is in English called the right of attribution, the right to claim authorship or 
“patrimony.”  See also Craig M. Bargher, The Export of Cultural Property and United 
States Property, 4 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 189 (1994) (arguing that the United 
States should tighten its export laws to preserve its cultural property). 
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recognizing at least some form of the collective right that Griphook 
actually seems to demand—a cultural moral right in important 
cultural objects that enables the descendants of that culture as a group 
to demand the return of the object.  Thus, our Muggle law is growing 
ever closer to goblin law, perhaps more rapidly than we realize. 
 
 
